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Abstract There is an emerging political economics literature which purports to show that
legislatures elected based on proportional electoral rules spend more and redistribute more
than legislatures elected based on majoritarian electoral rules. Going a step further the au-
thors of this paper consider whether degree of electoral proportionality has an impact on
population health and, in particular, the health of the least advantaged members of society.
A panel of 24 parliamentary democracies for the years 1960–2004 is used to examine the
relationship between electoral institutions and health. The authors find that greater electoral
proportionality is positively associated with overall population health (as indicated by life
expectancy) and with the health of the poorest (as indicated by a reduction in infant mortal-
ity). A panel of 17 countries for the years 1970–2004 is then used to show to that electoral
permissiveness modifies the impact of health spending on infant mortality.
Keywords Electoral disproportionality · Redistributive policy · Infant mortality · Life
expectancy
1 Introduction
There is an extensive and rich body of research in comparative politics on the relation-
ship between electoral systems and party systems. The received wisdom is that electoral
rules that induce proportionality tend to result in multi-party systems and coalition or mi-
nority governments, while majoritarian electoral rules tend to result in two-party systems
and single-party governments (Duverger 1964; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994;
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Cox 1997). Recently political economists have begun to examine the effect of electoral insti-
tutions on government spending and redistribution. Empirical evidence has been presented
in support of the claim that legislatures elected under proportional representation (i) spend
more (or run a larger budget deficit) (Persson et al. 2007; Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006;
Blume et al. 2009), (ii) spend more on social security and welfare (Persson and Tabellini
2003, 2004; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Alesina and Glaeser 2004: 81–87) and (iii) redis-
tribute more (Iversen and Soskice 2006; Ticchi and Vindigni 2010) than legislatures elected
under majoritarian rules.
Going a step further we consider what impact, if any, electoral institutions have on human
well-being as measured by population health. There is a growing body of research which
purports to show that democracies devote more resources to health-promoting resources
such as health care and education than their more autocratic counterparts (see, for example,
Brown and Hunter 1999; Deacon 2009; Ghobarah et al. 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
2001; Lake and Baum 2001; Przeworski et al. 2000). More recently scholars have presented
cross-country evidence in support of the claim that democratic governance leads to lower
infant mortality rates and higher life expectancies than autocratic governance (Besley and
Kudamatsu 2006; Franco et al. 2004; Gerring et al. 2007; Zweifel and Navia 2000).1 In this
paper we examine the extent to which, if at all, the health dividend of democratic rule is
conditioned by electoral procedures.
2 Electoral rules, government spending and health
Meltzer and Richard (1981) have formulated perhaps the most influential model of the rela-
tionship between democratic governance and public redistributive policies.2 They contend
that the usual skewing of the income distribution towards the upper-income quintile will
lead to redistribution up to the point at which the distortionary effects of taxation entails
that the voter with the median income (whose vote is decisive) no longer benefits. Thus,
the model predicts that democracies with greater inequality in pre-tax and transfer earn-
ings will typically be more redistributive. However, there are two related problems with
the Meltzer-Richard model. Firstly, because the median voter occupies the middle-income
quintile it is not strictly necessary that legislators must also redistribute to the lower-income
quintile—that is to say, a political party may win enough seats to govern even if it lacks the
support of lower-income voters. Secondly, it turns out that advanced democracies with less
income inequality actually redistribute more than democracies with more income inequality
(Iversen and Soskice 2009: 440–441). Thus, the standard model in the political economy
literature does not adequately explain why some democracies are more redistributive than
others.
An alternative explanation for the observed variation in redistributive policies is the dif-
fering democratic institutions that have been adopted in each country. In keeping with that
institutionalist approach a growing number of scholars have argued that electoral rules can
1Although Ross (2006) has presented cross-country evidence which casts doubt on the claim that democratic
rule has a greater reductive effect on infant and child mortality than autocratic rule.
2Their approach builds on the seminal studies on collective decision-making and redistribution by Downs
(1957), Tullock (1959), Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Riker (1962). For a detailed review of the literature
see Mueller (2003, especially Chaps. 5 & 21). Recent examples of scholars who have adopted the Meltzer-
Richard model include Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Boix (2003).
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play a particularly important role in determining the magnitude and distribution of govern-
ment spending.3 From the literature it is possible to distinguish a direct and indirect expla-
nation for that linkage. The first type of explanation emphasizes the incentives that electoral
rules place on individual politicians, whereas the second emphasizes the effect of those rules
on the party system as well as government type and partisanship.
In keeping with the direct explanation Persson and Tabellini (2003: 17–18; also Lizzeri
and Persico 2001) contend that legislatures elected based on proportional electoral rules
tend to spend more on redistributive programs in virtue of the incentives created by district
magnitude (number of seats per electoral district). Majoritarian electoral systems are char-
acterized by single member districts. This encourages politicians to target spending on those
swing districts required to obtain a winning number of seats in the legislature. By contrast
PR electoral systems typically have large, often national, districts. That encourages politi-
cians to spend on universalistic benefit programs and general public goods such as health
care. In addition, the PR electoral formula means a party requires a comparatively greater
proportion of the national vote (i.e. 50%) in order to control the legislature—thus there is
a further incentive to provide benefits and public goods, and to provide them to a larger
proportion of the population.
The indirect explanation taps into the rich vein of research in comparative politics on
the impact of electoral rules on party fragmentation and government type. Democracies
that utilize a winner-takes-all formula are typically characterized by a two-party system and
single-party governments, whereas countries with proportional electoral formula tend to be
characterized by a multi-party system and coalition governments. However, the degree to
which a proportional electoral formula actually permits party fragmentation is significantly
dependent on district magnitude (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 112–125). Drawing on those
findings Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) and Persson and colleagues (2007) argue that conflict
within the coalition governments that are typically produced by PR leads to higher levels
of government spending than the single-party governments that are typically produced by
majoritarian rules. Coalition governments create a common pool problem in virtue of the
fact that the cost of spending is spread amongst the supporters of all parties. However, this
does not in itself show that legislatures elected under a PR system are more redistributive
than their majoritarian counterparts.
By focusing on the effects of electoral rules on government partisanship Iversen and
Soskice (2006) have developed a model to account for the prediction that PR-elected gov-
ernments are more redistributive. Their explanation begins from the observation that PR
systems tend to produce center-left governments, whereas majoritarian systems tend to pro-
duce center-right governments. They argue that this tendency is because of the effect of
electoral institutions on government partisanship. Middle-income voters in a majoritarian
system prefer low taxes (and less benefits) by a center-right party for fear that an elected
left party would veer away from its centrist electoral platform and tax both the wealthy and
middle class. Under a PR system, by contrast, the middle-class party has an incentive to
form a coalition with the left party so they can both ‘exploit’ the rich.
The partisanship model can also be adapted to explain public subsidies for health and
education.4 Under PR the middle-income party will collude with the lower-income party to
3For a review of the literature see Persson and Tabellini (2004).
4On the extension of the partisanship model to public education see Iversen and Stephens (2008), Iversen
and Soskice (2009: 454–455) and Ansell (2006). As with redistribution those studies find that PR-elected
legislatures tend to spend more on public education than majoritarian-elected legislatures.
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ensure their supporters have access to education and health care (e.g. more spending on pre-
school, primary and secondary education, greater investment in public health care). Whereas
under a majoritarian system middle-income voters will prefer the center-right party so as to
avoid the possibility of being taxed to fund schooling and health care for the lower-income
class (thus, partially subsidized higher education, greater reliance on private health insurance
and out-of-pocket health payments etc.).
Our contention in this article is that the theorized effect of electoral rules on government
spending will, in turn, have an impact on population health. That is to say, PR-elected legis-
latures are more likely to ensure that health-enhancing resources such as income transfers,
medical care and education are available to a broader segment of the population and to en-
sure that they reach the poorest segment of the population. That prediction is consistent with
the direct and indirect explanations introduced above. According to the first explanation,
majoritarian rules will encourage politicians to target health-promoting resources towards
pivotal groups of voters. According to the partisanship reading of the second explanation,
majoritarian rules will tend to produce center-right governments and, therefore, less spend-
ing on health-promoting resources for the middle and lower-income classes. In the statistical
analysis that follows we were unable to rule out the possibility that electoral institutions have
an effect on population health via both these channels.
There are two important arguments for using health outcomes to assess democratic insti-
tutions such as electoral rules. The first draws on the human capabilities approach developed
by the economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, whereas the second draws on the human
capital approach which prevails in the economics literature on income growth. The first line
of argument is that mortality and morbidity represent a more accurate metric of human well-
being than resource-based metrics such as disposable income. This is because the capability
to avoid premature death and preventable illness is valued in itself, it typically results from
other capabilities that we have independent reason to value highly (e.g. the acquisition of
cognitive abilities), and it is crucial to the achievement of other capabilities (e.g. productive
agency) (Sen 1992, 1998; see also Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2006). Resources matter
according to this approach, but only insofar as they enable improvements in health.
The instrumental role of health hints at the second reason for using health outcomes to as-
sess democratic institutions. As a number of authors have noted, improvements in health can
have a significant impact on human capital formation—primarily, but not only, because the
incentive to privately invest in education increases as survival rates improve (see e.g. Soares
2005). Some political economists have considered the impact of electoral rules on public in-
vestment in education and, thereby, the distribution of income (Iversen and Stephens 2008;
Ansell 2006). It seems reasonable to assume, however, that public investments in health will
also have a positive effect on private investments in education and, as a result, the distrib-
ution of income. For example, public provisioning that successfully extends the longevity
of the least advantaged members of society will encourage an increase educational attain-
ment, thereby, leveling-up household income. Alternatively, public provisioning of health-
enhancing resources may directly affect the distribution of income because improved health
will have a positive impact on marginal productivity (e.g. reduces the likelihood of leav-
ing the labor force or taking early retirement) (Cutler et al. 2006: 114). Thus, health status
represents a normatively more satisfying basis for assessing the public policy implications
of electoral rules and, at the same time, it constitutes an important determinant of income
growth and the distribution of income.
Besley and Kudamatsu (2006, long version) have presented what appears to be the only
existing analysis of electoral institutions and population health. Based on a panel of coun-
tries that were democratic between 1956 and 2002 they found no evidence that life ex-
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pectancy is affected by whether a country has adopted a majoritarian or proportional elec-
toral formula. Our approach in the cross-country analysis that follows differs in two impor-
tant respects. Firstly, our key dependent variable is infant mortality. Infant mortality tends to
afflict the poorest segment of the population. Moreover, it typically arises because of causes
that are both easier and less expensive to prevent than the causes of adult mortality. In theory,
therefore, infant mortality ought to be more sensitive than longevity to the effects of electoral
rules on public policy. Secondly, rather than type of electoral formula we employ degree of
disproportionality in the translation of share of electoral votes into share of legislative seats
as our indicator of electoral rules. The advantage of using electoral disproportionality is that
it is more sensitive to the variety of factors, other than just electoral formula, that define each
country’s electoral system. The permissiveness of a PR electoral system, for example, is to
a significant extent dependent upon district magnitude.
3 Empirical evidence
In order to test the hypothesis that PR electoral systems tend to produce healthier popula-
tions than majoritarian electoral systems we use a panel of 28 democracies that have been
independent since 1950 and have experienced uninterrupted democratic rule for each year
during the period 1960–2004. Our criterion for democratic rule is a score of above zero on
the Polity2 index compiled by the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).5
3.1 Model specification
We use country fixed-effects in the model specification so as to help mitigate any omitted
variable bias. One drawback of fixed-effect models is that they tend to underestimate the
impact of variables that move slowly over time. During the sample period significant elec-
toral reforms were relatively rare—only New Zealand, Japan, Italy, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
France and Venezuela changed type of electoral formula between 1960 and 2004. It is partly
for that reason that we use electoral disproportionality as our proxy for electoral rules. Dis-
proportionality captures changes in all the components that comprise the electoral system
and, therefore, is more likely to vary over time within each country. Note that a significant
shortcoming of the existing political economy literature on electoral institutions is that it
almost exclusively relies on a dichotomous variable for electoral rules (i.e. PR or majoritar-
ian) and does not adequately control for the possibility of omitted variable bias.6 To control
for the upward trend in life expectancy and downward trend in infant mortality during the
sample period we also include period fixed-effects in the specification.
5Country list: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, United Kingdom and Venezuela. Malta is in-
cluded even though it was not independent until 1964 because it has been internally self-governing polity
since 1947. It may be argued that Colombia, Costa Rica, India, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Venezuela
should not be included because they are significantly less democratized and/or economically developed than
the other countries in the sample. We introduce controls to address that concern and in the robustness section
we test to see whether those six countries are driving the results. In the robustness section we also examine
whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of the four presidential democracies (i.e. Colombia, Costa
Rica, United States and Venezuela).
6On the latter concern see Acemoglu (2005). For a notable exception to the rule see Persson et al. (2007).
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3.2 Variables
Because we are primarily interested in effectiveness of public policy in promoting health we
focus on outcome (i.e. mortality rates), rather than provisioning variables (e.g. public ex-
penditure on health and education, immunization rates, health practitioners per capita, etc).
Health outcomes enable us to take into account the effect of electoral rules on the targeting
of government provisioning and not just the extent of government provisioning. With that in
mind, our dependent variables are infant mortality (number of infants who perish during the
first year of life, per 1,000 live births) and life expectancy at birth.7 Infant mortality is of par-
ticular interest because it is tends to be concentrated amongst the least-advantaged members
of society in both developing and developed countries (Gwatkin et al. 2007; de Looper and
Lafortune 2009: 21–22). What is more, infant mortality typically results from causes that are
comparatively easier and less costly to prevent (e.g. through access to clean water, immu-
nization, antibiotics, nutritional needs, perinatal and postnatal medical care etc.). We would
expect, therefore, that infant mortality rates will be more responsive to the effect (if any) of
electoral procedures on the distribution of health-promoting resources. On the other hand,
testing for the effect of electoral rules on life expectancy enables us to at least partially cap-
ture the incidence of morbidity across the entire population—even non-fatal illnesses will
tend to have a negative impact on an individual’s lifespan.
Our key independent variable is the degree of disproportionality in the conversion of
share of electoral votes into share of legislative seats. The measure of disproportionality that
we use is the least squares index (LSq) developed by Michael Gallagher (1991).8 In theory
the index ranges from 0 (perfect proportionality) to 100 (candidate without any votes obtains
a seat). The advantage of using electoral disproportionality is that it captures in one index all
the key components of the electoral system (i.e. formula, district magnitude, assembly size,
national or district threshold etc). In addition, it provides a suitable way of accounting for
those countries that employ a two-tier electoral system—especially in those cases such as
Germany, Japan since 1996, Italy since 1994 and New Zealand since 1996 where a plurality
rule is used in the lower tier and a proportional rule is used in the upper tier. Although
disproportionality is explicitly concerned with the mechanical effect of electoral rules (i.e.
conversion of vote shares into seat shares), it will also at least partially capture the so-called
psychological effect of electoral rules on voters (i.e. the effect on the decision whether to
vote and, if so, which party to vote for) (Duverger 1964). As disproportionality increases we
would expect increasingly more voters to be dissuaded from voting for small parties.
Electoral disproportionality may be influenced by exogenous determinants of the number
of electoral parties (e.g. social heterogeneity), rather than just the permissiveness of the
electoral system. The persistence of a large number of parties in a country with a PR system
may result in an unexpectedly high level of disproportionality. Equally, the absence of small
parties in a country with a majoritarian system may result in an unexpectedly low level of
7Both mortality variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2009).
8LSq is the average divergence between the share of votes received and the share of seats obtained:
LSq =
√
1
2
∑
(vi − si ),
where vi is the vote share of the i-th party and si is the seat share of the i-th party. The LSq data is drawn from
Appendix B of Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). Note that an updated version of that data set can be found on
Michael Gallagher’s electoral system website at http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/
ElSystems/index.php.
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disproportionality (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 123). Note, however, that the presence of
that phenomenon amongst the countries in the sample will mean that the regression results
underestimate the health effects of electoral permissiveness. Nevertheless, we take explicit
steps to control for the exogenous determinants of electoral fragmentation in the robustness
section below.
We also consider the impact of party fragmentation and government type on infant mor-
tality and life expectancy. Given the theories discussed above we would expect that the
multipartism and coalition governments that are typically produced by PR electoral systems
will have more of a pro-health effect than the twopartism and single-party governments that
are typically produced by majoritarian electoral systems. Our measure of party fragmenta-
tion is the effective number of parliamentary parties index (ENPP) developed by Laakso and
Taagepera (1979).9 For our indicator of government type we use number of parties in the
government (government parties).10
The fixed-effect specification of the panel data helps to control for the possibility of
unmeasured country-specific factors. This is necessary given that countries may self-select
into electoral systems based on unmeasured factors (e.g. colonial origin and social cleav-
ages) that are also correlated with population health. Nevertheless, it still remains necessary
to control for those time-varying factors that might be determining both the electoral vari-
ables and population health. For that reason we include the following four control variables
in each of the regressions. GDP per capita (logged) is included as a control for level of eco-
nomic development.11 Total population (logged) is included because there is some evidence
to suggest that size may influence the degree of party fragmentation.12 Anckar (2000), for
example, argues that larger populations are characterized by a higher degree of diversity. In
addition, smaller countries (such as Malta, Iceland and Luxembourg) may exhibit a greater
degree of disproportionality in virtue of the small size of their assemblies (Lijphart 1999:
154–155). Proportion of the total population voting in elections (participation, logged) is
included so as to control for the absence of universal suffrage in Switzerland before 1971
and South Africa before 1994.13 Finally, we control for the age and quality of democracy in
each country given that democratic experience may influence the number of political par-
ties as well as population health. Our democratic stock (logged) variable is based on the
Polity2 index produced by the Polity IV project. We constructed this variable by converting
the Polity2 scale of −10 to +10 into a positive scale ranging from 1–21. Then for each year
from 1960–2004 we calculated each country’s total score since 1950.14
9ENPP is the number of parliamentary parties weighted by their shares of seats:
N1 = 1/
∑
(si ),
where si is the seat share of the i-th party. For the elections from 1960–2000 the ENPP data is drawn
from Matt Golder’s data set (2005). For elections from 2001–2004 we rely on Appendix B of Gallagher
and Mitchell (2008).
10Our primary source for this variable is the annual political data produced by the European Journal of
Political Research. For the countries not included in that data set we referred to Nohlen et al. (1999, 2001),
Nohlen (2005).
11GDP per capita (PPP converted and in thousand constant 2000 international dollars) is based on the chain
series index of the Penn World Table 6.2 (variable RGDPCH) (Heston et al. 2006).
12The population data is drawn from World Development Indicators 2009.
13The participation data is taken from Vanhanen (2008).
14Because the Polity IV data set does not include information for countries with populations less than 500,000
(i.e. Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta) we used the expanded Polity2 index compiled by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch
at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/polity.html.
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Table 1 Summary statistics for first panel
Variable Obs. Missing Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
(%)
Infant Mortality 1260 27.86 16.00 17.81 2.80 156.60 3.63471 19.32118
Life expectancy 1260 22.46 73.67 5.11 42.26 82.03 −2.278712 10.9161
Government parties 1260 0.56 2.06 1.42 0.00 9.00 1.508545 5.452818
ENPP 1260 3.17 3.43 1.39 1.41 9.05 1.209324 4.550065
LSq 1260 14.84 5.34 4.89 0.26 25.25 1.642364 5.255183
ENEP 1260 3.17 3.98 1.52 1.97 10.29 1.253809 5.03011
GDP per capita 1260 0.32 15230.00 8066.00 866.10 50760.00 0.388817 3.492706
Population 1260 0.00 5.47E+07 1.44E+08 1.76E+05 1.08E+09 4.737352 27.00425
Participation 1260 0.32 49.53 13.78 3.90 70.00 −1.17096 4.333959
Democratic stock 1260 0.00 665.10 270.90 114.00 1155.00 0.045852 1.878444
3.3 Data set and multiple imputation
After constructing the data set we found that observations were missing for a non-trivial
number of country-years (Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the non-imputed
panel). Deleting those cases with missing values would significantly undermine the effi-
ciency of the model and may bias the results. Thus, we used the Amelia multiple imputation
program to generate a balanced panel (Honaker et al. 2009). Multiple imputation uses the ob-
served values to generate multiple estimates for each missing value. The variation between
each imputed value is intended to reflect the estimated level of uncertainty in predicting each
missing value (King et al. 2001; Schafer 1997). We used an imputation model that was mul-
tivariate normal to generate five ‘complete’ data sets. We then ran our fixed-effect models
for each of those data sets. Finally, we combined the estimation results by using a procedure
outlined by King et al. (2001: 53). A single coefficient was produced for each independent
variable by taking the average of the estimates produced by each imputed data set, while a
single standard error for each coefficient was produced by using a formula that takes into
account variance both within and across each imputed data set.
4 Empirical results
Do countries where the legislature is selected based on electoral rules that encourage propor-
tionality have healthier populations? Does electoral proportionality have a positive impact
on the health of the least advantaged members of society? Table 2 present the results of our
statistical analysis for infant mortality and life expectancy respectively. As we can see from
columns 1 and 2 there is a strong and significant correlation between both the number of
government parties and the degree of party fragmentation and infant mortality. This pro-
vides at least indirect confirmation that PR electoral systems have a greater reductive effect
on infant mortality than majoritarian electoral systems. This evidence is only indirect, how-
ever, because factors other than electoral system permissiveness may be contributing to the
degree of party fragmentation (e.g. social cleavages).
More explicit evidence for our hypothesis is provided by our indicator of electoral rules.
From column 3 we can see that the coefficient for LSq carries the expected sign and is signif-
icant at 1%. Other things being equal, a decrease in LSq by 10 points (which is, for example,
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Table 2 Electoral institutions and mortality
Dependent variable: Infant mortality Life expectancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Government −0.388a 0.060c
parties (0.113) (0.030)
ENPP −0.653a 0.095a
(0.116) (0.040)
LSq 0.226a 0.226a −0.016c −0.017b
(0.038) (0.0378) (0.009) (0.009)
ENEP −0.567a 0.121a
(0.109) (0.039)
GDP per capita −7.734a −5.623a −6.452a −6.262a 1.578a 1.620a 1.513a 1.582a
(logged) (0.899) (0.893) (0.875) (0.879) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.240)
Population −15.905a −12.836a −12.149a −13.902a 1.416a 1.385a 1.332a 1.375a
(logged) (1.314) (1.261) (1.371) (1.391) (0.322) (0.322) (0.332) (0.333)
Participation −1.794b −1.673b −0.450 −0.757 0.591a 0.616a 0.564a 0.602a
(logged) (0.725) (0.707) (0.759) (0.756) (0.174) (0.178) (0.181) (0.184)
Democratic stock −24.722a −20.210a −28.307a −28.355a 9.311a 9.693a 9.215a 9.471a
(logged) (6.144) (6.112) (6.348) (6.332) (1.446) (1.450) (1.446) (1.443)
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Observations 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260
Notes: Includes country fixed-effects and period fixed effects. Robust standard clustered at country level
errors are reported in brackets below regression coefficients. Sample period: 1960–2004. Each country year
represents a single observation
asignificant at 1%
b5%
c10%
the average difference in proportionality between Australia and the Netherlands) is, on aver-
age, associated with approximately 2.5 less infant deaths per 1,000 live births. Given that in-
fant mortality tends to be concentrated amongst the poorest, these results are consistent with
the claim that the less advantaged will have greater access to health-promoting resources
(e.g. food, health care, education etc) under PR-elected legislatures than majoritarian-elected
legislatures.
We were able to generate similar results with regard to life expectancy. As predicted frag-
mentation and government type are positively associated with longevity (columns 5 and 6),
while electoral disproportionality is negatively associated with longevity (column 7). Al-
though note that the coefficients and significance levels are lower than was the case with
infant mortality. That is consistent with the observation that infant mortality is compara-
tively easier and inexpensive to prevent and, therefore, more responsive to the targeting of
health-enhancing resources.
The coefficient for electoral disproportionality decreased but remained significant when
the number of parliamentary or government parties was included amongst the explanatory
variables. Thus, we are unable to rule out the possibility that the impact of electoral rules on
health is both direct (e.g. via incentive-effect on individual politicians) and indirect (e.g. via
government partisanship).
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5 Robustness checks
It may be argued that electoral disproportionality is affected by factors other than elec-
toral rules which also determine mortality. Social cleavages, for example, have been shown
to be an important condition for the number of parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994;
Neto and Cox 1997) as well as a significant determinant of infant and child mortality (Filmer
and Pritchett 1999). The impact of social heterogeneity on disproportionality is likely to be
more pronounced in those countries where the electoral rules are restrictive. In democracies
with single-member districts, for example, an increase in the number of electoral parties as
a result of social fragmentation will typically mean that more parties will fail to achieve a
plurality of votes in each district (Lijphart 1994: 76–77; Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 123).
The fixed-effect specification we employ will control for unmeasured factors such as social
cleavages insofar as they are time-invariant. Nevertheless, to control for the possibility that
such factors are time-varying within countries in our sample we include the degree of elec-
toral party fragmentation amongst the independent variables. Our measure of fragmentation
is the effective number of electoral parties index (ENEP) outlined by Laakso and Taagepera
(1979).15 Note that the inclusion of electoral fragmentation means that the regression will
no longer capture the psychological effect of electoral rules. It does, however, mean that the
disproportionality variable is not reflecting changes in the number of electoral parties that
are not due to changes in electoral permissiveness. As can be seen from column 4 and 8 in
Table 2, disproportionality remains negatively correlated with infant mortality and positively
correlated with life expectancy even when we control for the fragmentation of electoral par-
ties.
It may also be argued that changes in income inequality during the sample period are
driving changes in electoral rules (see e.g. Ticchi and Vindigni 2010), as well as popula-
tion health (see e.g. Wilkinson 1996). Alternatively it may be argued that changes in the
population structure are influencing electoral rule changes as well as health outcomes. We
controlled for both of those possibilities by including distribution of income as measured
by the GINI coefficient, as well as proportion of population aged 14 and below and propor-
tion of the population aged 65 and above in the baseline regressions.16 Our results were not
substantially altered by the introduction of those additional control variables.
It remains possible that time-varying factors, other than those already controlled for,
are determining the degree of electoral permissiveness. To control for the potential pres-
ence of endogeniety the Hausman test was applied using the number of government parties
and ENPP as instruments for LSq. To carry out the Hausman test, we run two OLS re-
gressions. For the first regression, LSq was regressed on all the exogenous variables and
instruments. For the second regression the infant mortality and life expectancy equations
were re-estimated with the residuals from the first-stage regression as additional regressors.
The coefficients for the residuals were not statistically significant, thus the hypothesis that
LSq is endogenous is rejected.
It might also be argued that presidential democracies should be excluded from the analy-
sis on the grounds that government spending in those countries is a product of bargaining
15ENEP is the number of electoral parties weighted by their shares of votes:
N1 = 1/
∑
(si ),
where vi is the vote share of the i-th party. The data sources are the same as those listed in footnote 8.
16GINI data taken from UTIP (2008) and population data taken from World Development Indicators 2009.
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between the legislature and executive and, as a result, is less sensitive to the electoral rules
that select the former. In order to accommodate that concern we ran each of the baseline re-
gressions without those countries where the executive is not subject to a confidence vote by
the legislature (i.e. Colombia, Costa Rica, United States and Venezuela). The results were
not significantly altered when we removed those four countries from the sample.
Finally, it may be argued that Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Sri Lanka, South Africa and
Venezuela should not be included in the baseline analysis on the grounds that they are less
democratized and significantly poorer than the remaining 24 countries in the sample. We
have included GDP per capita, democratic stock and electoral participation in order to at
least partly control for that discrepancy. Reassuringly there was not a significant change in
our results when we ran each of the baseline regressions without those six countries in the
panel.
6 Electoral rules and the targeting of health-promoting resources
Thus far we have presented evidence in support of the claim that electoral proportionality
has a reductive effect on mortality. This is consistent with the theoretical claim that the pro-
health effect of electoral permissiveness is at least partly explained by the effect of electoral
rules on policy-making that determines the distribution of health-promoting resources (such
as health care, education, welfare transfers etc.). We now turn to provide explicit evidence
for that distributional pathway.
A number of authors have noted that aggregate measures of health provisioning (public
expenditure on health, births attended, immunization rates, health practitioners per capita
etc) are not particularly good predictors of health outcomes (Bidani and Ravallion 1997;
Filmer and Pritchett 1999; McGuire 2005). They contend that much depends on the whether
those health-enhancing resources actually reach those who need them the most. With regard
to health spending, for example, the existing evidence suggests that additional spending on
health leads to better health outcomes among low spending countries, but not amongst high
spending countries. Moreover, there is a considerable degree of variation in performance
amongst low spending countries and high spending countries respectively, suggesting that
effective targeting is a crucial factor (see Evans et al. 2001; Poullier et al. 2003). That in
turn suggests that the observed pro-health effect of electoral permissiveness is to a large
extent explained by its impact on the distribution of health-enhancing resources, rather than
its impact on how much is invested in those resources. We test that claim by examining
whether electoral rules modify the effect of health spending on infant mortality.
In order to capture the conditioning effect we employ a model specification that includes
the interaction between LSq and public expenditure on health (% GDP). Public expenditure
data for the years 1970–2004 is available for the 17 European countries in our original
sample (WHO 2010).17 As before, we use a fixed-effect specification and the same time-
varying control variables. We also included electoral fragmentation (ENEP) so as to control
for the impact of social heterogeneity on electoral proportionality and health. In addition,
we employed a first-order autoregressive process to correct for the detected presence of
autocorrelation and a time trend variable so as to control for the concurrent downward trend
in infant mortality and upward trend in health spending. In order to estimate the missing
values in the data set we used exactly the same multiple imputation process as the previous
model (Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the non-imputed panel).
17Country list: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
606 Public Choice (2011) 148:595–610
Table 3 Summary statistics for second panel
Variable Obs. Missing Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
(%)
Infant Mortality 595 18.32 9.09 4.89 2.80 29.60 1.516308 5.411992
LSq 595 0.00 4.14 4.48 0.34 25.25 2.455169 8.860502
Public expenditure 595 21.01 5.97 1.22 2.76 8.72 0.184964 2.329077
on health (% GDP)
ENEP 595 0.00 4.56 1.70 2.00 10.29 0.955591 4.072165
GDP per capita 595 0.00 19810.00 6302.00 2997.00 50760.00 1.017014 6.765446
Population 595 0.00 1.88E+07 2.49E+07 2.04E+05 8.25E+07 1.334973 3.167443
Participation 595 0.00 57.27 7.16 27.70 70.00 -0.650761 3.85499
Democratic stock 595 0.00 790.40 211.30 382.00 1155.00 0.012958 1.819133
Table 4 Modifying effect of
electoral disproportionality
Notes: Includes country
fixed-effects. Robust standard
clustered at country level errors
are reported in brackets below
regression coefficients. Sample
period: 1970–2004. Each country
year represents a single
observation
asignificant at 1%
b5%
c10%
Dependent variable: infant mortality (1)
Public health expenditure (% GDP) * LSq 0.039b
(0.018)
Public health expenditure (% GDP) −1.138a
(0.133)
LSq −0.254c
(0.131)
ENEP −0.404a
(0.128)
GDP per capita (logged) −1.591
(1.097)
Population (logged) 2.394
(2.434)
Participation (logged) −0.446
(0.972)
Democratic stock (logged) −17.128a
(4.344)
Trend 0.174
(0.121)
AR(1) 0.520a
(0.036)
Countries 17
Observations 578
From the interaction term in Table 4 we can see that the reductive effect of health spend-
ing diminishes as electoral disproportionality increases. Note that the constitutive terms for
LSq and public expenditure represent the marginal effect under the unrealistic assumption
that, respectively, public health expenditure is zero and LSq is zero (i.e. perfect proportion-
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Fig. 1 Marginal effect of public health expenditure on infant mortality
ality).18 Figure 1 captures the marginal effect of expenditure for a more plausible set of
disproportionality scores—namely, the range of LSq values in our sample. The upper and
lower 95% confidence intervals indicate that the modifying effect remains significant until
the degree of disproportionality reaches 23 (only France exceeds that score and only during
the 1993–1996 legislative term). These results confirm that the impact of electoral institu-
tions on the way in which government health spending is distributed at least partly explains
the linkage between those institutions and population health.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have used the comparative electoral systems and comparative political econ-
omy literature to develop the theoretical predication that degree of electoral proportionality
has a positive impact on population health. A small but growing number of political econo-
mists have studied the impact of electoral rules on the magnitude and distribution of gov-
ernment spending. They provide evidence in support of the prediction that electoral pro-
portionality leads to greater redistribution. In this study we have gone a step further and
examined whether greater proportionality has a beneficial impact on population health and,
more specifically, the health of the least advantaged members of society. Population health
18Thus, the coefficient for LSq in Table 4 appears to indicate that, contrary to theoretical expectations, elec-
toral disproportionality has a reductive effect on infant mortality. However, that only follows if we incorrectly
interpret the constitutive term as the unconditional or average effect of LSq (see Brambor et al. 2006). Indeed
the linear-additive specification of the model (i.e. same specification as Table 2) shows that (for the sample
of European countries) LSq has a positive average effect on infant mortality. Moreover, it seems reasonable
to expect that the health effect of electoral rules will also be conditioned by the burden that the prevention of
child mortality places on the adult population. When we tested that claim by adding the interaction between
LSq and share of the population aged 14 and below to the multiplicative model we found that the marginal
effect of LSq for the mean levels of population aged 14 and below and health expenditure in our sample is
positive. In addition, the results for the conditioning effect of LSq on health expenditure were not significantly
altered by the inclusion of the second interaction term.
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represents an important basis for assessing electoral institutions both because it provides a
direct measure of human well-being and because of its effect on human capital formation.
We have found that greater electoral proportionality is positively associated with overall
population health (as indicated by life expectancy) and with the health of the poorest (as
indicated by a reduction in infant mortality). Significantly those results held even when a
number of steps were taken to control for the potential presence of unmeasured factors that
may be simultaneously determining electoral institutions as well as population health. In
addition, we presented evidence that electoral proportionality conditions the effect of health
spending on infant mortality. This is in keeping with the theoretical claim that electoral rules
effect health in virtue of their impact on the distribution of health-promoting resources.
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